Abstract:
I will contend that the association of the term "Platonism"
with essentialist doctrines is obscene, wrongheaded, and fails to
appreciate the anti-essentialist subtlety contained within Plato's dialogues.
Throughout the following, I endeavor to show that the exchanges
among Plato's Visitor and Theaetetus are
not manufactured or intended to demonstrate the inadequacies of
essentialist projects, but rather to lay bare the impossibility of
such projects.
Throughout
the following, I will maintain that from Plato's remarks throughout
Sophist,
one may derive an endorsement of an alternative model of meaning or
reference, a model wherein terms are not incautiously quarantined
and their references or significances interrogated in isolation,
bereft of context or application, i.e. as names
of things,
but instead a model which (1) prioritizes the collaborative structure
of ordinary grammar and discourse as an activity
among participants which “accomplishes” something, i.e. it
satisfies some immediate objective or task, and it is this total
linguistic practice
which confers intelligibility upon terms (2) in
prioritizing the necessarily-collaborative structure of grammar, our
Visitor – and it will be assumed throughout that the Visitor
represents Plato's perspective – rebukes the essentialist project,
or a Theory of Forms, via an interrogation of speech acts which
demonstrates the necessary interdependence of verbs and nouns, the
consequence of which is: the effort to locate or establish any
essences of verbs or of things in isolation, is unintelligible.
Specifically, I will maintain that the following argument may be
legitimately derived from Plato's remarks throughout Sophist:
(i)
a conservative construal of the Theory of Forms entails an
intelligible correspondence between some discrete term and some
discrete entity, concept or state-of-affairs. To be a form means
to be discrete, independent, essential, and unreliant upon other
things.
(ii)
that
a term may successfully correspond to some thing, concept or
state-of-affairs is fundamentally inseparable from how
a term comes to correspond to some thing, concept or
state-of-affairs.
(iii)
insofar as a term may or does
correspond or “refer”, how
a term comes to correspond to some thing, concept or state-of-affairs
necessarily
involves an accompanying plurality of additional interdependent
terms, and an accompanying objective
of some sort, all of which transpire within a total
cultural-linguistic practice.
(iv) Any specification and intelligibility of
“forms” is thus contingent upon association, viz. upon successful
collaboration, combination or “blending” of one form among other
forms (and related grammatical operators, i.e. pronouns, adverbs,
etc) within a total linguistic practice.
(v)
So: forms are never really independent or discrete; they are always
and necessarily contingent.
(vi) So: forms are not really forms.
Point (i)
should be appreciated as follows: there are many interpretations and
ways of understanding Plato's notion of Forms, and I will outline
none of them here. I contend (i) is a conservative construal because
any Theory of Forms must at least entail (i). While
many interpretations of the Forms may add to (i), none may
subtract from (i).
I maintain
further that the above perspective represented in i – vi should
help to better elucidate the more explicit objective of the dialogue,
viz. to properly delineate the practice of philosophy from sophistry,
to determine what sorts of practices are symptomatic of each.
Accordingly, Plato's central project throughout seems a rebuke of the
Theory of Forms, and to qualify any attempts to establish concrete or
transcendent essences of things as mere sophistry, distinct from
philosophy or “true refutation”. 1
A few key
reminders to the reader: firstly, the following is not an attempt to
give any exhaustive treatment of the Sophist;
its themes are many, and as this paper is of limited scope, it will
focus on critical passages to the exclusion of much of the text.
That said, every effort has been made to preserve and appreciate the
original context from which each of the selected passages was
excerpted. Perhaps more importantly, I have deliberately selected
passages which are no longer points of contention throughout the
dialogue, viz. the Visitor and Theaetetus consider the issues
contained within said passages to be more or less settled.
This strongly suggests that Plato took such conclusions quite
seriously, and did not regard them as tentative or provisional.
I will remain
relatively neutral concerning questions whether Plato explicitly
intended to confer upon his readers any lessons specifying the
authority of ordinary language, or whether his primary objective was
to critique the practice of philosophy itself, i.e. to caution the
budding philosopher against a susceptibility to engage in the
incautious wordplay of mere sophistry. Rather, I'm suggesting a
model of language and reference – and an argument supporting such a
model – which may be legitimately derived from the dialogue,
one that is corrosive of the Theory of Forms. While it is but one
possible interpretation of the text among many, the anti-essentialist
perspective outlined herein is so glaringly the centerpiece (or,
perhaps, the neglected stepchild) of Sophist that it deserves
to be taken seriously. We are here interrogating a quite meandering,
tangential and experimental discussion; to even suppose that Plato
had in mind any singular, isolable objective is probably to miss the
point altogether.
Grammar,
Predication and Intelligibility:
Plato makes
much of the notion of predication throughout Sophist,
carefully highlighting the centrality of predication throughout
ordinary grammar and thereby demonstrating that a proper appreciation
of the necessity and value of subject/predicate relations may relieve
confused thinkers – i.e. essentialists – of many difficulties.
Describing the philosophical missteps of “elderly” thinkers,
Plato's Visitor counsels Theaetetus that
“They
can grab hold of the handy idea that it's impossible for that which
is many to be one and for that which is one to be many. They
evidently enjoy forbidding us to say that a man is good, and only
letting us say that that which is good is good, or that the man is a
man. You've often met people, I suppose, who are carried away by
things like that. Sometimes they're elderly people who are amazed at
this kind of thing, because their understanding is so poor and they
think they've discovered something prodigiously wise.” 2
Line 1 above
represents a reproach of naïve essentialism while simultaneously
endorsing an appeal to ordinary language. Clearly, a description of
one lake as consisting of many gallons of water
represents no inconsistency, just as a description of many
celestial bodies may likewise comprise a description of one
solar system. Does one see just one driveway, or the many
tiny rocks which compose the driveway? Such static disjunctions are
altogether unnecessary, as statements concerning driveways and rocks
are ordinarily uttered or exercised in accord with some immediate
objective or utility, i.e. in response to peculiar questions
concerning either rocks or driveways.
Line 2 further
underscores the commonplace philosophical confusion between the “is”
of predication and the “is” of identity, anticipating our
contemporary analytic/synthetic distinctions. That said, its
strategic placement within the narrative – immediately following a
typically-exhaustive (and – in my estimation – intentionally
fruitless) exploration contrasting “that which is” against “that
which is not”, “sameness” and “difference”, “largeness”
with “smallness”, etc, and immediately prefacing a lengthy
examination of verb-noun and subject-predicate participation –
emphasizes the necessity of an attention to the operations of
language generally, and to
the centrality of predication
specifically; tautologies of the general form “man is man”
or “good is good” are vacuous and tell us nothing. While there
is not sufficient space here to quibble over the value of
tautologies, or precisely which statements effectively count as
analytic statements, it should suffice to say that, insofar as such
statements, e.g. “water is H2O”, are useful or engender some
response or behavior, it is because such statements are enclosed
within some context, circumstance, expectation or objective which
confers intelligibility upon them; the value is not contained
exclusively within such statements. I will return to this point in
the sections which follow.
Predicating
speech acts – whether descriptive, referential, or both, e.g. “Man
is good”, “Theaetetus sits”, “All humans have heads”, “the
book is there” – on the other hand, contain information and
possess causal capacity whether or not they are true. More
importantly, predicating speech acts describe relations, and,
as we shall see, Plato offers a way of securing both the sense and
the ontological legitimacy of such relations without the need
to appeal to any essences. Note also that the remainder of the above
passage openly mocks those who confusedly “think they've discovered
something prodigiously wise”, and – considered in the broader
context of the proposed objective of the dialogue, i.e. to delineate
philosophy from sophistry – it strongly suggests a repudiation of
essentialism, or at least an essentialism which proceeds from a
misunderstanding of speech acts.
Beginning at
261c, Plato again turns his attention to grammar and predication,
viz. to the necessary conditions of intelligible speech, highlighting
that a written or uttered sequence of names or nouns “lion stag
horse” or a series of verbs “walks runs sleeps” 3
fails to produce intelligible speech:
“So
no speech is formed just from names spoken in a row, and also not
from verbs that are spoken without names.” 4
Plato herein
underscores that such sequences neither describe nor refer; they
simply do not count as speech. 5
He then supplies a simple example of a predicating statement which
does satisfy basic requirements of intelligibility, “man
learns”. 6
Critically, Plato qualifies the import of such statements:
“And
he doesn't just name, but accomplishes something, by weaving
verbs with names. That's why we said he speaks and doesn't just
name.” 7
This short but
remarkable passage highlights the necessary presence of objectives,
contexts and circumstances exterior to any correspondence
between a word and that to which it refers; it demonstrates that even
when speaking does “name”, it doesn't just name: it
“accomplishes something”, i.e. it satisfies petitions or
objectives, it confers information relevant to some circumstance.
The above
remark should be appreciated in tandem with its complement: while the
former highlights the necessity of collaboration or participation
among verbs and nouns in order to achieve intelligibility, the
following underscores the consequences of subtracting a term
from neighboring grammatical or situational operators, expecting the
term in isolation to retain a static, concrete significance:
“To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy
totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is
what makes speech possible for us.” 8
This is a
startling observation: what is the central methodology and objective
of those attempting to establish a Theory of Forms, if not to
“dissociate each thing from everything else”? Plato's remark
suggests that such a project is self-refuting and has no chance of
success: both association among terms and dissociation
presuppose failure. The intelligibility of forms is contingent upon
the successful collaboration among forms – viz. verbs (to know, to
learn) and nouns (man, tree) – from which it follows that “forms”
cannot be construed in any classical sense, i.e. as discrete,
independent or essential. Plato's remarks from a preceding section
add greater clarity to the self-refutation implicit in essentialist
projects:
Visitor: “Moreover, the greatest absurdity of
all results from pursuing the theory of those very people who will
not allow one thing to share in the quality of another and so be
called by its name.”
Theaetetus: “How so?”
Visitor:
“Why, in referring to anything they cannot help using the words
'being' and 'apart' and 'from the others' and 'by itself' and any
number more. They cannot refrain from these expressions or from
connecting them in their statements, and so need not wait to refute
them; the foe is in their own household, as the saying goes, and,
like that queer fellow Eurycles, they carry about with them wherever
they go a voice in their own bellies to contradict them.” 9
We here again
note that intelligibility requires predicating sentences featuring
multiple “forms”, all of which are surrounded by a total
linguistic practice wherein terms derive their significances by
virtue of their ability to “share in the quality of another”
adjacent term. Forms
– by their very nature – are construed as independent, wholly
elemental and cannot “share in the quality of another” thing; and
Plato here qualifies this essentialist pursuit as “the greatest
absurdity of all”. Misunderstanding that the
intelligible expression of any single term requires the cooperation
of an entire family of terms, i.e. a grammar employed by a culture
with objectives, the essentialist fails to notice that that
which can be meaningfully said exhausts
what can be thought:
Visitor: “Aren't thought and speech the same,
except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the
voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself?”
Theaetetus:
“Of course.” 10
To
review: any Theory of
Forms, any existence or identification of forms, requires
intelligibility. But intelligibility presupposes articulation,
i.e. any specification of discrete forms, or any conceptual
differentiation among supposed forms, cannot be achieved but through
articulation. But articulation (specification, description,
differentiation) presupposes a grammar – viz. a total linguistic
practice – wherein the intelligibility of a term, or a term's
ability to effectively describe or reference some thing, event or
state-of-affairs, is necessarily contingent
upon a collaboration among forms. This, in turn, destroys the
possibility of any intelligible correspondence between a discrete
term and a discrete thing, event or state-of-affairs.
Relation,
Entailment and Consequences for a Theory of Forms:
Upon qualifying
the necessity of verb + noun participation in order to achieve
anything like intelligibility, Plato thereby – in my estimation –
opens the floodgates: if the verb “to know” necessarily requires
a conjoining or association with some noun, e.g. “man”, in order
to obtain intelligibility, then we may – at the very least –
conclude that Plato himself concedes that the verb “to know” or
“knowing” requires a one-place predicate (as we call it in
logic). Consider the following:
(∃x)(Rx)
This
says: “There exists some x
(a person) such that x
is Related” (or, perhaps, “x
is related to relation”). It is a problematic statement, because it
is not
a statement
at all: “relation” is far too broad, bereft of criterion, and
while it seems to entail some species of association, it could entail
virtually anything: x
is related to air because he breathes it, x
is related to the earth because he walks on it, and so on ad
infinitum. And an uncircumscribed entailment is no sort of
entailment whatsoever. Thankfully, no one attempts to speak in such
a fashion, as such would not amount to speech. Relation composes the
bedrock of our perception and speech, is not some independent or
general “thing” unto itself requiring a definitional account to
justify its use, and is ordinarily made clear via the specification
of things related, expressed in appropriate or meaningful
circumstances. Relations involve the fundamental apprehension of
contrasts and associations which necessarily precede
definitions or even the formalization of concepts, those bedrock
elements which permit anything like an “account” of phenomena to
even develop. Even the statement (∃x)(∃y)(Rxy
& Ryx) (assuming x
& y
are persons) presents challenges: it tells us that x
and y
are related, but little else: x
and y
could be neighbors, or cousins, or Koreans, or could share similar
occupations, or anything else.
But
if we specified a relation to some degree, e.g. (∃x)(Mx) (wherein M
indicates “married”), the specification “marriage”
meaningfully narrows relation: it tells us that x
is related to another human in a romantic or sexual fashion, rather
than in a strictly genealogical way, or many other possible ways. On
any interpretation, we might concede that this statement is – on
its own – sufficiently meaningful; but as the concept “marriage”
of
necessity
entails
a relation with someone other than x
– x
cannot
be married to himself – we are all the same licensed
to infer from (∃x)(Mx) that
(∃x)(Mx)
⊃{(∃y)(My)
& (Mxy & Myx)}.
That
is: if there exists some person x
that is married, then there must exist some person y,
such that x
is married to y.
We might say that the relation is sufficiently contained
within (∃x)(Mx); it specifies the relation without the need for
further inferences or unpacking. Better, we might say that (∃x)(Mx)
is an abbreviated
form
of {(∃x)(∃y)
(My)
& (Mxy & Myx)},
and that the two statements are – among proficient language users –
virtually isomorphic.
Now: what occurs if we apply
this same principle to other verbs of relation, e.g. to the verb “to
know”? That is, consider the simplistic: (∃x)(Kx) (K indicates
“knows”). This statement says: “there exists some x
such that x
knows”. As in the previous statement concerning the relation of
“marriage”, we should be licensed to infer:
(∃x)(Kx)
⊃{(∃y)(Kxy)}
That
is: “insofar as x
knows,
then there must exist some y
such that x
knows y”.
But
whereas the one-place predicate in (∃x)(Mx) is sufficiently
meaningful unto itself – it merely tells us something concerning
x's
relationship status – (∃x)(Kx) is vacuous: it tells us nothing.
More importantly, notice also that y
in (∃y)(Kxy) could
be absolutely anything;
a human, a trade, a skill, or anything else. While (Mxy & Myx) –
implicit in (∃x)(Mx) – specifies a particular type
of interpersonal association or arrangement, the statement (∃x)(Kx)
⊃{(∃y)(Kxy)}
– because it is bereft of any criterion concerning y
and
therefore vacuous – fails to establish anything like a relation.
While it renders explicit the logical necessity of some
object, skill or capacity, no meaningful relation may be said to
herein obtain. That is: the expression of a logical requirement
which demonstrates the necessity of a second-place predicate in order
for relation to obtain is
not itself
a specification which counts as a relation.
What
is the lesson here? Expressing “x
knows” is (somewhat) like saying “x
is related”; without the specification of some associated object,
skill or capacity – which completes the calculus of association –
we are only permitted to derive the logical necessity of some
second-place predicate, but not just
any
second-place predicate, e.g. not just a semantically-vacuous
variable. Accordingly, asking questions concerning any essence of
“knowing” or “relation” independent of some object, skill or
capacity makes no sense. Rather, it is via the “weaving together
of verbs and names”, i.e. predicating speech acts – and in this
instance, the necessity of a second-place
predicate – that intelligibility is conferred. Accordingly, in
light of the above observations, we may better negotiate Socrates'
famous solicitation of Theaetetus concerning the essence of
knowledge:
“...that
is not what you were asked, Theaetetus. You were not asked what one
may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are.
It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was
asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is. – or am I
talking nonsense?” 11
That
is: the Theaetetus of Sophist
might have answered, “Yes, Socrates: such questions are quite
nonsensical.”
So:
a relation without specification is no sort of relation whatever.
The essentialist might ask: “But if the verb “to know”
specifies a relation, precisely what sort
of relation does it specify?” This is a confused question: the
relation simply does not obtain
without (at least) three components: what knows, what is known, and
the connecting verb “to know”. This ensemble completes the
verbal specification; it does not denote
a relation – there are no species of independent or
priorly-existing relations to
denote – but, rather, it composes
relation. If relation cannot obtain sans
apprehension or specification, it makes no sense whatever to ask
which priorly-existing varieties of relation such apprehensions or
specifications as “x knows y” specify,
denote or correspond to; there simply are no earlier existing
varieties of “relation”.
“Jacks
knows karate” completes the specification of the relation
“knowing”; Jack can or cannot answer questions about karate, he
can or cannot execute certain maneuvers associated with the
discipline karate. It may be discovered that Jack was lying,
i.e. that he cannot answer questions about karate, or doesn't know
much
karate, or can't execute certain maneuvers, but these discoveries
simply highlight the fact that the relation “Jack knows karate”
is not at all obscure; while there may exist
some remaining ambiguities concerning whether Jack knows more
karate than Jill, or more about
karate, these ambiguities can be easily settled via a sequence of
follow-up questions and responses. And notice that such follow-up
questions do not “clear up” any ambiguities concerning the
relation “to know” itself;
these follow-up questions concern quantities
of what is known, not the relation itself, and transparently employ
the verb “to know” throughout such questions, which presupposes
the intelligibility of the term. All proficient language users –
save the notable exception of academic philosophers – understand
such terms in appropriate contexts.
Some
simple statements featuring just a subject and a one-place predicate,
e.g. (∃t)(St)
or “Theaetetus
sits”, are sufficiently intelligible without the addition of any
second-place predicate, i.e. they more-or-less adequately describe
some imaginable state-of-affairs without ambiguity. In short, the
predicate “sits” in such a statement requires no additional
object;
it merely qualifies the subject “Theaetetus”. That
said, the intelligibility of such statements may
often be contingent upon the context, situation or the circumstances
under which such statements are uttered. For example, if the
statement “Theaetetus sits” is uttered as a response to the
question “how far is the Embarcadero”, the former statement will
surely lack intelligibility; “Theaetetus sits” is incommensurable
with any candidate-response which might satisfy the petitioner's
needs in such an instance, and so accomplishes
nothing. Accordingly, the intelligibility of a statement presupposes
circumstances appropriate for that statement's application or
utterance, i.e. intelligibility is contingent upon contexts
accommodative of such statements.
Thus,
establishing the necessity of a one-place predicate to achieve
coherence or intelligibility does not
suggest that Plato regarded one-place predicates as always
sufficient conditions
for intelligible speech – it would be silly to expect Plato to
comprehensively list or highlight the number of predicates or
qualifications in accord with each peculiar combination of verbs and
nouns necessary to accomplish a meaningful speech act throughout all
circumstances. Instead, it means that Plato concedes the necessity
of predication generally
in order to achieve intelligibility, and that the peculiarities of
predication throughout ordinary grammar are not subordinate to any
prior categories or independently-existing species of relation.
Concerning
which of the Forms are able to effectively “blend” and which are
unable, our Visitor likens the combinatorial possibilities of
complimentary forms to letters of an alphabet, asking
Visitor: So does everyone know which kinds of
letters can associate with which, or does it take an expert?”
Theaetetus: “It takes an expert.”
Visitor: “What kind?”
Clearly,
Plato's multiple references to grammar, syntax, naming and speech
throughout the text are not at all incidental, but suggest a model of
language – and an associated philosophical method – intended to
effectively dispense with the difficulties and confusions which often
accompany any consideration of the Forms. In the above passage we
are reminded that, sans some grammatical expertise possessed by both
speaker and listener, nothing akin to a Form may be either
articulated nor recognized.
If
such verbs are relational,
i.e. if – by virtue of their very appearance – they adequately
specify a peculiar relation or state-of-affairs which obtain between
some subject
and some object,
then it is clear that some second-place predicate is necessary to
secure meaning, as such relational verbs presuppose
both subject and
object. In this respect, the statement “Theaetetus sits” is
quite unlike
the statement “Theaetetus knows”; while the former simply
describes Theaetetus's physical posture, and implies little beyond
the physical boundary of the subject “Theaetetus”, the latter
statement necessarily transcends
the boundaries or conditions of the subject “Theaetetus”, and
implies some peculiar relation between Theaetetus and some x.
Said another way, while the verb “to sit” adjoined to some
subject satisfies a criterion of propositional intelligibility, the
verb “to know” adjoined to some subject without an accompanying
second-place predicate demonstrably fails
to satisfy this criterion.
To review:
the articulation of forms requires the “weaving” together of
verbs and nouns (and other grammatical operators), which is called
predication.
All predicating statements invoke relations. But there exist no
general “forms” of relation itself,
or any articulable varieties of relation which might precede
specifications of relation established via predicating statements.
Some predicating verbs – e.g. “to sit” – require only a
one-place predicate, while others – e.g. “to know” – require
a second-place predicate in order to achieve intelligibility.
Accordingly, the Theory of Forms, i.e. the entire epistemological
project concerned with locating a precise correspondence between the
verb “to know” and some unique or “independent” species of
relation is fundamentally confused.
Relations
and Their Ontological Status:
Visitor: “And we need to use every argument
we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge,
understanding and intelligence but at the same time asserts anything
at all about it.”
Theaetetus: “Definitely.”
Visitor:
“The philosopher – the person who values these things the most –
absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything is at
rest, either from defenders of the one or from friends of the many
forms. In addition he has to refuse to listen to people who say that
that which is
changes in every way. He has to be like a child begging for “both”,
and say that that which is
– everything – is both the unchanging and that which changes.”
13
By invoking the
concepts of knowledge or understanding as coherent objects of
analysis, Plato insists that one openly concedes the fundamental
intelligibility of such concepts; to search for something or to
analyze something presupposes
the intelligibility and specification of some discrete object or
target. By invoking knowledge throughout a range of circumstances or
speech acts, we do not name or identify some thing;
rather, via acts of predication, e.g. “Jack knows karate”, we
describe a relation
which obtains between a subject (Jack) and something else (an object,
an ability, etc), and this relation amounts to a capacity,
i.e. the relation – which is itself not
a physically-extended “thing” – possesses causal
efficacy.
“I'm
saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either
by nature to do something to something else or to have even the
smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it
only happens once. I'll take it as a definition that those
which are
amount to nothing other than capacity.”
14
Consider the statement “Jack
is taller than Jill”; it expresses a relation
of height which obtains between Jack and Jill. While relations are
not extended, physical things or entities, such relations
nevertheless possess being, insofar as such relations effectively
account
for some phenomena, or comprise
some causal difference. This relation of height may reward or
disadvantage Jack or Jill in accord with the accomplishment of a
variety of tasks: Jack must behave
differently
than Jill in order to trespass an opening through which Jill passes
easily. Similarly, the perception of this relation may also
influence the behavior of other entities: Jill's liability in height
might render her an easier or more palatable target for some predator
when contrasted with Jack's more physically-imposing presence. One
might manufacture countless examples: while the statement “Bill is
Polish” – which expresses Bill's relation to Poland – might
afford
Bill unobstructed access to his nation of origin, it may also invite
the derision of a bigot convinced that persons of Polish origin are
somehow compromised. But Jack's legs might be severed, or Jill
might grow taller than Jack, or Bill's Polish citizenship might be
revoked; in each of these instances – and innumerable others –
the relation may “do something to something else” or may have
something “done to it”, i.e. the relation itself
possesses causal efficacy or
causal vulnerability.
The
reality or being of such relational capacities (to know, to
understand, or anything else) is not contingent upon any prior
securement of essences, as essences concern a thing's identity, i.e.
that which a thing just is.
Relations, we might say, are essentially unessential;
because relations are necessarily composite, involving different
species of contrasts between a plurality of subjects, objects,
features, skills, tasks or events for
some creature in accord with its
objectives, it makes no sense to speak of relations as independent
things possessing any essence. A relation which is “there” for
one organism may be “absent” for another; but this fact obviously
does not devalue the ontological status of relations.
As
previously outlined, it would be futile to search for any essence of
“relation” itself;
the varieties of possible relation are virtually infinite in number,
and are creature-specific.
While the perception of a relation – e.g. the relation of height
between Jack and Jill, the similarity or difference in color between
blossom and leaf – may be available to one organism, that relation
might be quite unavailable to another organism for whom that relation
affords no behavioral possibilities, i.e. an organism whose
objectives or concerns are exterior to the perception of such
relations. Where no possibility of a behavior – e.g. of reward or
risk in the negotiation of a task or terrain – is involved, no such
relations will be available for
that organism. The difference in color between blossom and leaf is a
relation which is there
for the honeybee (which sees in color, and for whom the blossom
offers nourishment and behavioral possibilities), but is
not there
for the dog (which sees in black and white, and for whom the blossom
represents no nourishment and no behavioral possibilities).
As
such, asking “what are the total number of relations present” or
“what is really
constitutive of relation” concerns the total number of possible
contrasts and comparisons, or the total number of possible
differences
resident within some experiential ensemble. But asking “what is
the total number of differences here really”
or “what is really
constitutive of difference in all cases” are vacuous solicitations
which only possess the surface features of a question.
The
Visitor continues:
Visitor: “So
that which is
indisputably is not millions of things, and all of the others
together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in
many ways.”
Theaetetus: “True.”
Visitor: “And
if anyone doesn't believe these contrarieties, he has to think about
them himself and say something better than what we've said. But if
he thinks he's recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the
argument back and forth, then he's been carried away by something
that's not worth much of anyone's attention – ...that is, we should
leave pointless things like this alone. Instead we should be able to
scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what's different is
the same in a certain way or that what's the same is different in a
certain way, we should understand just what he means, and the precise
way in which he's saying
that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that
which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice
versa, or when he makes what's large appear small or something that's
similar appear dissimilar – well, if someone enjoys trotting out
contraries like that in discussion, that's not true refutation.” 15
This
passage is remarkable in a number of ways. We
have already seen that that
which is
amounts to a capacity,
i.e. an ability to cause something or to be effected by something.
Here, Plato concludes an exhaustive discussion concerning relations
of difference or similarity, noting in Line 1 that that
which is
might legitimately be said to consist of every “thing” together
(e.g. as an ensemble), and also each thing individually, as well the
various ways
each thing is and is not. The “ways” things are or are not
involve predicating statements describing relations, and such
relations possess capacity,
and so possess being.
On
this model, the predicating statements “blossom x
is red” and “blossom x
is taller than
blossom y”
each describe a relation which both is
and
is not:
the relation between blossom and redness does not obtain for the
colorblind canine, and the relation of height between blossoms x
& y
does not obtain for some creature whose body scale relative to the
size of the blossoms precludes any comparative perception of height.
Similarly, the statements “these two x
blossoms are the same” and “these two x
blossoms are not the same” both – by virtue of describing a
relation which obtains for some perceiving organism – legitimately
represent that which is;
while the former may indicate a relation of sameness of color or
species, the latter may point toward the simple fact that the two
blossoms cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
In
Line 2, Plato underscores
that “trotting out contraries”, e.g. suggesting a relation of
difference or similarity among two things without any qualification,
results in nonsense: if difference or similarity obtained everywhere
or in just “any old” 16
circumstance, then the possibility of any “correct” attribution
of difference or similarity concomitantly dissolves; bereft of any
criterion
concerning measures of comparative difference or similarity –
however arbitrary the criterion might be – contrastive ascriptions
make no sense. Further, Plato insists that a “step by step”
scrutiny should adequately reveal the precise sense
in which two things are said to be same or different, and that if an
individual cannot grasp the above and continues “dragging the
argument back and forth” without qualification, then “we should
leave pointless things like this alone”. For example, while the
remark that ice is both similar and
dissimilar to liquid water might represent an apparent contradiction
to a confused or duplicitous thinker – i.e. a sophist
– Plato here urges an appreciation of and attention to the
speaker's
intentions
as a method to dissolve such confusions.
To
review:
any conservative construal of a Theory of Forms concerns what is,
or what “is real”. All predicating statements invoke relations.
Many perceived relations, or predicating statements describing such
relations, possess causal efficacy or capacity,
i.e. they may “do something to something else” or may have
something “done to” them. That which possesses capacity
possesses being. Accordingly, any metaphysical theory or model is
not
contingent upon traditional ontological models of physicality or
reference,
viz. a discrete correspondence between a single term and some
discrete, isolable “extended” entity, but is rather a matter of
whether things, ensembles or events appear before for some perceiving
organism as
a discrete
event which might in turn influence that organism's behavior.
Naming
and Reference:
We are now in a
position to better evaluate the rather weak claim in (i), that a
conservative construal of any Theory of Forms entails an intelligible
correspondence between some discrete term and some discrete entity,
concept or state-of-affairs. While we have already demonstrated the
infeasibility of such a model, we have yet to explicitly dispense
with traditional notions of reference.
I will not here attempt to catalog the range of philosophers who've
embraced such an erroneous model, but it should suffice to say that
any “picture theory” concerning the operations of language, i.e.
a view shared by Augustine, Locke and many others, is defective.
Again, consider 262d:
“...he
doesn't just name, but accomplishes
something, by weaving verbs with names. That's why we said he speaks
and doesn't just name.” 17
In the above quote, we again
note Plato rebuking a peculiar theory concerning the operations of
language, i.e. that the primary task of a grammar is to uniquely name
or correspond to objects in the world. Accordingly, let's soberly
consider the notion of naming or “reference”. We employ the term
liberally throughout philosophical contexts, but rarely pause to
reflect properly upon what is contained within or implied by the
term. To avoid equivocation, we herein do not mean the
act of
“referring” to the phonebook or the Internet; we're primarily
interrogating the philosophical use of the term, i.e. whether a word,
concept or sentence refers to or corresponds
with some thing or some state-of-affairs in the world. We are here
exploring the term “to refer” as it relates to the act of
indicating,
which might be accomplished via some written or spoken sentence, or
via an act of ostension, e.g. wherein one says “tree” while
physically pointing toward or indicating →
some specimen of tree.
The
philosophical notion of reference is often reflexively accepted as an
entirely empirical affair: either a term immediately corresponds with
some physical entity, or some sentence appropriately models the
structure of some event or state-of-affairs; a simple matter of
measuring or contrasting the constituents of some proposition against
whatever that proposition endeavors to suggest or affirm. But I will
submit that rarely is it noticed that the very acts of “referencing”
or “indicating” are accomplishable solely by virtue of a grammar
which has evolved the very notions or concepts
of reference, indication or correspondence. That is: the very notion
of “reference” itself belongs
to grammar, and the act of referencing anything whatever presupposes
a shared grammar accommodative of some act which might be (a)
intended
or self-articulated
as
an act of reference by some individual, and (b) interpreted
by
some other as an act of reference. If this is the case, it would
seem that a total linguistic practice occupies a position of some
priority, or precedes
any possibility of reference, and, accordingly, precludes
the possibility of any supposedly isolable term from referring just
to any isolable entity.
Acts of reference or indication are broader-reaching, non-exclusive
and more diffuse than any immediate gesture might possibly betray; in
attempting to reference a solitary entity or state-of-affairs, we
implicitly depend upon and access a total cultural-linguistic
practice. Again, this fact dissolves any possibility that our
conservative construal of a Theory of Forms might ever be true.
Even
if the speaker's intention is to reference or indicate some solitary
object or event, if reference succeeds, i.e. if the listener grasps
the speaker's intention, such success is accomplished only by virtue
of a total
linguistic practice; it is not merely a one-to-one correspondence
which obtains between an isolated word “tree” and an isolated
object called a “tree”; the word “tree” is always employed in
tandem with various grammatical operators, i.e. the term “tree”
is never isolated, but always surrounded. Additionally, reference is
ordinarily couched within some broader objective
exterior to a mere one-to-one correspondence between word and object;
acts of reference intend to accomplish
something or to satisfy some objective. Moreover, even if the
written or spoken term “tree” – isolated and bereft of context
– is
apprehended, it is apprehended because it is implicitly
surrounded by a broader family of grammar which lends intelligibility
to it.
But
notice that words do not ever
appear before subjects truly isolated or bereft of context; if a word
is apprehended or recognized as
a word, then it is – ipso facto – implicitly enclosed within a
context. Insofar as a word appears for some subject as
an intelligible word, as opposed to some insignificant sound or
meaningless scrawling, an intelligible backdrop of adjacent
grammatical operators is necessarily implied; this is what
intelligibility means.
As such, a word necessarily acquires its significance from that
which is not immediately present.
Note that this
is just as true of syntax and grammar: the characters “b”, “a”
and “t” unto themselves do not signify or mean anything. Place
these characters together in this sequence, and one perceives the
word “bat”, and one's inclination is to suggest that this
sequence of characters now successfully accomplishes
reference. But one may “bat” one's eyes, or swing a baseball
“bat”, or fear the vampire “bat”, and a subject encountering
the spoken or written word “bat” – isolated and bereft of
context – could not possibly discern which use was intended;
divorced from any backdrops or contexts, the term has no
particular use or meaning, no accompanying intention or reference.
Objects – whether terrestrial surface features or syntactical
characters – acquire their respective intelligibilities or
significances by virtue of surrounding objects.
As Wittgenstein
points out, acts of ostension – e.g. indicating the identity,
utility or color of an object for a child – are informed by the
contextual circumstances of the utterance, i.e. the objectives
involved. One learns what a word is for via a range of
illustrations and demonstrations, and via corrections of
misapplication, e.g. “no: the object itself is not called 'blue';
blue is its color”. What a word does, and how
it does this, i.e. how the cultural processes of training and
technique conspire to permit referential speech acts, cannot be
conveniently divorced from what a word represents. Again,
what a word is for is intimately connected with a total
cultural and linguistic practice, i.e. what Wittgenstein called
“forms of life”.
Any theory of
reference must account for the necessary conditions
satisfactory for the completion of referential speech acts. But such
conditions are necessarily historical; the success of present
speech acts involving reference is contingent upon the rich
and varying history of a word's application, the long arc of a
grammar's development, and the individual training of both
speaker and recipient. While such conditions are not easily amenable
to explicit quantification, the theorist must concede that the
subtraction of such conditions would be tantamount to a
subtraction of intelligible speech, and that the omission of such
conditions from one's account greatly impoverishes any theory of
reference.
Accordingly,
this does not bode well for Forms construed as essences, or for
discrete words unto themselves immediately “corresponding”
to any essences, solitary things or states-of-affairs. The entire
idea that the effective use of a term is somehow “unintelligible”
in the absence of an ironclad definition which accounts for all
applications of a term, or the idea that the use of a term like
“justice” or “knowledge” should enjoy a faithful one-to-one
mapping in reference to some discrete species of relation or
state-of-affairs, is – in light of the above observations – a
transparently naïve philosophical preoccupation. The verb “to
know” – uttered by some subject in tandem with some object, skill
or activity, e.g. “Jack knows karate” – possesses causal
capacity, viz. it has an uncontroversial, long-cultivated use
or utility among proficient language speakers; it “accomplishes
something”. The effective or successful application of any term is
the product of a collaborative historical-cultural process whereby
useless terms fall out of favor, and new terms are engineered,
introduced and culturally inculcated. The appropriate application of
all such terms shifts and transforms in accord with the tides of
cultural objectives and individual perspectives. It is the uniquely
philosophical preoccupation with establishing essences which imports
confusion into an otherwise understandable model of language. That
“knowledge”, or “justice”, or “behavior” might not
indicate any static, immovable state-of-affairs or relation does not
diminish the coherent use of such terms, as such misguided
expectations presuppose that intelligibility or actuality is
predicated solely upon some prior essences, while ignoring the basic
utility of successful grammatical exchanges. In short, it is that
expectation itself – rather than the common use of such terms –
which lacks coherence.
In
light of the above remarks concerning the necessary conditions of
reference, let''s briefly revisit 252b – c:
Visitor: “Moreover, the greatest absurdity of
all results from pursuing the theory of those very people who will
not allow one thing to share in the quality of another and so be
called by its name.”
Theaetetus: “How so?”
Visitor:
“Why, in referring to anything they cannot help using the words
'being' and 'apart' and 'from the others' and 'by itself' and any
number more. They cannot refrain from these expressions or from
connecting them in their statements, and so need not wait to refute
them; the foe is in their own household, as the saying goes, and,
like that queer fellow Eurycles, they carry about with them wherever
they go a voice in their own bellies to contradict them.” 18
The subtle importance of the
above passage ought not be overlooked. Concerning acts of reference,
Plato explicitly highlights the logical necessity of a total
linguistic practice involving a multiplicity of forms in order to
achieve an intelligible act of reference; that the very articulation
or identification of sameness or difference, essence or independence
necessarily requires
an accompanying plurality of forms. Accordingly, if properly
understood, the essentialist's project is self-refuting; the myriad
processes and the necessary conditions which confer intelligibility
upon a term or concept negate the possibility of a term's
“independence”. Returning full circle to the passage with which
we began the present investigation, it is perhaps easier to now
appreciate the import of
“To
dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally
everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what
makes speech possible for us.” 19
One cannot help but detect a
strong affinity between such remarks and those of Wittgenstein
concerning the accompaniment of a broader linguistic practice, and
the history and background of grammatical training which necessarily
informs basic acts of reference:
“'I
set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.' – Yes, given the
whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is
it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a
lever; it may be anything, or nothing.” 20
When
we maintain “x
refers to y”,
or “the subject n
of this proposition corresponds directly to a human named Nancy whose
existence is empirically-verifiable”, we participate in so
much more
than is immediately apparent in an act of reference. Plato's point
is that the very notion of studying a term or a concept in isolation,
divorced from any instantiations, contexts or examples, is not merely
a wrong-headed endeavor; it is fundamentally
impossible,
and the supposition that such could be accomplished is the product of
delusion, i.e. of failing to calculate those additional variables
which inform but are not always immediately visible or apparent in a
speaker's statement.
1Plato,
Ed. John M. Cooper, Complete Works, “Sophist” (1997,
Hackett, Indiana), 259c
2Ibid,
251c
3Ibid,
262b - c
4Ibid,
262a
5Ibid,
262b
6Ibid,
262c
7Ibid,
262d
8Ibid,
259e
9Ibid,
252b - c
10Ibid,
263e
11Plato,
Ed. John M. Cooper, Complete Works, “Theaetetus” (1997,
Hackett, Indiana), 146e
12Plato,
Ed. John M. Cooper, Complete Works, “Sophist” (1997,
Hackett, Indiana), 253a
13Ibid,
249d
14Ibid,
247e
15Ibid,
259b - c
16Ibid,
259d
17Ibid,
262d
18Ibid,
252b - c
19Ibid,
259e
